Arbeitspapier

Dynamic privacy choices

I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period, consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates more information about the consumer, thereby increasing platform profits. When the platform can commit to the future privacy policy, it collects information by committing to gradually decrease the level of privacy protection. In the long run, consumers lose privacy and receive low payoffs but choose high activity levels. In contrast, the platform with weaker commitment power may attain the commitment outcome or fail to collect any data, depending on consumer expectations regarding future privacy protection.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2022-8

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Economic models

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ichihashi, Shota
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2022

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2022-8
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ichihashi, Shota
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2022

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