Government ownership, informed trading, and private information

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the nature and extent of information asymmetry among traders in companies with government ownership. Consistent with a less transparent information environment, we find relatively less informed trading in the shares of firms with government presence, and specifically, fewer informed trades related to the skilled analysis of public information. At the same time, we also find that firms with government presence have a significantly higher proportion of informed trading that arises from explicitly private information, consistent with the literature on the self-serving influence of government stakeholders not necessarily committed to maximizing firm value.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 15-13

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
• Subject: Government ownership ; Privatization ; Information asymmetry ; Informed trading ; Private information

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Borisova, Ginka ; Yadav, Pradeep K.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
• (where): Cologne
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118650
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET