Arbeitspapier
Optimal Trading Mechanisms for an Informed Seller
We consider the situation where the owner of some good wants to sell the good to one of several potential buyers. We assume that the owner possesses private information about the buyers' valuations of the good, and analyze this model as an informed principal mechanism design model. In an undominated perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model the seller gives the object to the person who values the object most, and receives a transfer payment from each potential buyer such that all ex-ante expected rents are extracted from the buyers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 33/2002
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
informed principal
mechanism design
Marktmechanismus
Asymmetrische Information
Agency Theory
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Tisljar, Rolf
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Tisljar, Rolf
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2002
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Optimal IPO design with informed trading
Stochastic optimal control for online seller under reputational mechanisms
Informed trading and market efficiency
Informed trading and market efficiency
Informed Trading in Oil-Futures Market
Multiple-Project Financing with Informed Trading
Frequent batch auctions and informed trading
Frequent batch auctions and informed trading
Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets
Know your customer: Informed trading by banks
Government ownership, informed trading, and private information
Know your customer: informed trading by banks
Optimal IPO design with informed trading
Stochastic optimal control for online seller under reputational mechanisms
Informed trading and market efficiency
Informed trading and market efficiency
Informed Trading in Oil-Futures Market
Multiple-Project Financing with Informed Trading
Frequent batch auctions and informed trading
Frequent batch auctions and informed trading
Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets
Know your customer: Informed trading by banks
Government ownership, informed trading, and private information
Know your customer: informed trading by banks
Optimal IPO design with informed trading
Stochastic optimal control for online seller under reputational mechanisms
Informed trading and market efficiency
Informed trading and market efficiency
Informed Trading in Oil-Futures Market
Multiple-Project Financing with Informed Trading
Frequent batch auctions and informed trading
Frequent batch auctions and informed trading
Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets
Know your customer: Informed trading by banks
Government ownership, informed trading, and private information