Arbeitspapier
On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations
We derive a natural definition of responsibility in a formal model where employees care for their career prospects: A superior holds a subordinate responsible for a task, when she announces her beliefs that this subordinate contributes most to this task. We show, that those announced beliefs lead to a self fulfilling prophecy as the reputation of the responsible subordinate then is affected by the outcome of the task and he therefore has strong incentives to contribute to its success. There are equilibria where either a single agent or no agent is responsible for a task but joint responsibility never arises. Several extensions are discussed.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1423
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- Subject
-
responsibility
career concern
reputation
delegation
incentives
Verantwortung
Agency Theory
Erwerbsverlauf
Prestige
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Sliwka, Dirk
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2004
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