Arbeitspapier

Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length and Nominal Wage Flexibility

We show in a union-bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long-term wage contracts lead to highter expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short-term contracts. Therefore lower benefits reduce the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long-term than with short-term contracts and thus create an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers work in the same direction. Lower taxes associated with lower benefits also tend to make short-term contracts more attractive.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 514

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Nominal wage flexibility
contracts length
macroeconomic fluctuations
unemployment benefits

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Calmfors, Lars
Johansson, Åsa
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Calmfors, Lars
  • Johansson, Åsa
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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