Arbeitspapier
Disobedience and Authority
This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they have no better information than the principal. The allocation of authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and agency problems emphasized in the literature. Evidence from a national survey of organizations shows that worker autonomy is related to separation costs as the theory predicts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1109
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
- Thema
-
Delegation
Authority
Separation Costs
Optimal employment contracts
Führungsstil
Autorität
Kooperative Führung
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Marino, Anthony M.
Matsusaka, John G.
Zabojnik, Jan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Marino, Anthony M.
- Matsusaka, John G.
- Zabojnik, Jan
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2006
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