Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All

Arbeitspapier

This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working for them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the U.S.), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 407

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Higher Education; Research Institutions
• Subject: contests ; educational quotas ; private benefits ; social welfare ; Antidiskriminierungsrecht ; Bildungspolitik ; Minderheit ; Subvention ; Schulbesuch ; Schulauswahl ; Theorie ; USA ; Indien

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Krishna, Kala ; Tarasov, Alexander
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2013

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17196
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93812
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17196-3
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET