Arbeitspapier

Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All

This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working for them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the U.S.), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 407

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Higher Education; Research Institutions
Thema
contests
educational quotas
private benefits
social welfare
Antidiskriminierungsrecht
Bildungspolitik
Minderheit
Subvention
Schulbesuch
Schulauswahl
Theorie
USA
Indien

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Krishna, Kala
Tarasov, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17196
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17196-3
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Krishna, Kala
  • Tarasov, Alexander
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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