Arbeitspapier
Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All
This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working for them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the U.S.), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 407
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Higher Education; Research Institutions
- Thema
-
contests
educational quotas
private benefits
social welfare
Antidiskriminierungsrecht
Bildungspolitik
Minderheit
Subvention
Schulbesuch
Schulauswahl
Theorie
USA
Indien
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Krishna, Kala
Tarasov, Alexander
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17196
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17196-3
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Krishna, Kala
- Tarasov, Alexander
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2013