Tax competition and governmental efficiency: Theory and evidence

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the impact of a government's efficiency on the taxation policy of a state. Namely, we claim that the countries are different both in the way they tax capital and the way they spend the collected revenue. We build a model of 2 countries competing for foreign investment, government of one of them is more efficient than the other one, which means that it is able to produce more public good out of the same revenue. We show that the country with the more efficient government will charge higher income tax from firms. The theoretical predictions are then tested on a sample of OECD countries, years 1996-2005. In general, empirical results are in line with the theory.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: BGPE Discussion Paper ; No. 59

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock ; State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
• Thema: international taxation ; public finance ; asymmetric equilibrium ; tax competition

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Ivanyna, Maksym
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)
• (wo): Nürnberg
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73394
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ