Arbeitspapier

On the relationship between borrower and bank risk

We use tools from survival analysis to study the equilibrium probability of bank failure in a model with imperfect correlation in loan defaults where a systematic risk factor and idiosyncratic frailty factors govern borrower credit worth. We derive several surprising results: in equilibrium, a bank can be more likely to fail with less risky than with more risky borrowers. In addition, the equilibrium relationship between borrower and bank risk can be fundamentally altered by a greater dispersion of the frailty factors, similar to how mixing items of different durability can fundamentally change the overall aging pattern.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 294

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Thema
Correlated defaults
borrower heterogeneity
bank failure
survival analysis

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mitkov, Yuliyan
Schüwer, Ulrich
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
(wo)
Bonn and Cologne
(wann)
2024

Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mitkov, Yuliyan
  • Schüwer, Ulrich
  • University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)

Entstanden

  • 2024

Ähnliche Objekte (12)