Arbeitspapier

On the Relationship Between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability

In a 2 x2 symmetric game with two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, one risk-dominates another if and only if the equilibrium strategy is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. In a n x n symmetric game, we call a strategy globally risk-dominant if it is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. We show that if a finite coordination game has a globally risk-dominant equilibrium then this is the one that is selected by the stochastic equilibrium selection processes proposed by Young and by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1122

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Maruta, Toshimasa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
1995

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Maruta, Toshimasa
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 1995

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