Arbeitspapier
On the Relationship Between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability
In a 2 x2 symmetric game with two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, one risk-dominates another if and only if the equilibrium strategy is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. In a n x n symmetric game, we call a strategy globally risk-dominant if it is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. We show that if a finite coordination game has a globally risk-dominant equilibrium then this is the one that is selected by the stochastic equilibrium selection processes proposed by Young and by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1122
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Maruta, Toshimasa
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1995
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Maruta, Toshimasa
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1995