Konferenzbeitrag
A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition
This paper investigates competition between health care insurance companies under different funding regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German health care reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that competition by contributions can yield lower company profits and higher consumer welfare than competition by premia when switching between insurance companies is costly.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Health Insurance ; No. C18-V3
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Subject
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Health Care Reform
Competition
Consumer Choice
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kemnitz, Alexander
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Verein für Socialpolitik
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Kemnitz, Alexander
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Time of origin
- 2010
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