Konferenzbeitrag
Risk Selection under Public Health Insurance with Opt-out
This paper studies risk selection between public and private health insurance when some individuals can purchase private insurance by opting out of otherwise mandatory public insurance. Using a theoretical model, I show that public insurance is adversely selected when insurers and insureds are symmetrically informed about health-related risks, and that selection can be of any type (advantageous or adverse) when insureds have private information about health risks. Drawing on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I find that: (1) public insurance is adversely selected under the German public health insurance with opt-out scheme, (2) individuals adversely select public insurance based on self-assessed health and advantageously select public insurance based on risk aversion, and (3) there is evidence of asymmetric information.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Health Economics 2 ; No. B19-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
National Government Expenditures and Health
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Panthöfer, Sebastian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Panthöfer, Sebastian
Entstanden
- 2015
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