Arbeitspapier

Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share Prices

We demonstrate a 'preemptive merger mechanism' which may explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices. A merger may confer strong negative externalilties on the firms outside the merger. If being an 'insider' is better than being an 'outsider', firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with someone else. Furthermore, the pre-merger value of a merging firm is low, since it reflects the risk of becoming an outsider. These results are derived in a model of endogenous mergers which predicts the conditions under which a merger occurs, when it occurs, and how the surplus is divided.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 511

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Mergers & acquisitions
definsive merger
coalition formation
antitrust policy
Übernahme
Fusion
Wettbewerbsstrategie
Spieltheorie
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
Stennek, Johan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
  • Stennek, Johan
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Entstanden

  • 1999

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