Artikel

Can taxes raise output and reduce inequality? The case of lobbying

One of the key institutional elements for reducing inequality is the tax and transfer system. However, economists and policymakers usually view high taxes as detrimental to economic growth. We isolate one important mechanism by which higher taxes reduce inequality and raise per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at the same time. This mechanism operates in the presence of unproductive lobbying. Higher taxes induce a reallocation from lobbying toward production. This raises overall output and reduces the consumption gap between those who benefit from lobbying and those who bear its negative effects.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Scottish Journal of Political Economy ; ISSN: 1467-9485 ; Volume: 67 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 5 ; Pages: 455-461 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
equity‐efficiency trade‐off
inequality
lobbying
rent‐seeking
taxation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Prettner, Klaus
Rostam‐Afschar, Davud
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.1111/sjpe.12248
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Prettner, Klaus
  • Rostam‐Afschar, Davud
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2020

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