Artikel
Can taxes raise output and reduce inequality? The case of lobbying
One of the key institutional elements for reducing inequality is the tax and transfer system. However, economists and policymakers usually view high taxes as detrimental to economic growth. We isolate one important mechanism by which higher taxes reduce inequality and raise per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at the same time. This mechanism operates in the presence of unproductive lobbying. Higher taxes induce a reallocation from lobbying toward production. This raises overall output and reduces the consumption gap between those who benefit from lobbying and those who bear its negative effects.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Scottish Journal of Political Economy ; ISSN: 1467-9485 ; Volume: 67 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 5 ; Pages: 455-461 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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equity‐efficiency trade‐off
inequality
lobbying
rent‐seeking
taxation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Prettner, Klaus
Rostam‐Afschar, Davud
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wiley
- (where)
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Hoboken, NJ
- (when)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.1111/sjpe.12248
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Prettner, Klaus
- Rostam‐Afschar, Davud
- Wiley
Time of origin
- 2020