Arbeitspapier

Meaningful Talk

This paper develops a semiotic-inferential model of verbal communication for incomplete information games: a language is seen as a set of conventional signs that point to types, and the credibility of a message depends on the strategic context. Formally, there is an encoding-decoding step where the receiver can understand the sender's message if and only if a common language is used, and an inferential step where the receiver may either trust the message's literal meaning or disregard it when updating priors. The epistemic requirement that information be transmitted through the literal meaning of the message uttered leads to an equilibrium concept distinct from a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, ruling out informative equilibria where language is not used in its ordinary sense. The paper also proposes a refinement by which the sender selects among equilibria if all sender types are willing to play the same equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IDB Working Paper Series ; No. IDB-WP-571

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Cheap talk
Language
Literal and equilibrium meaning
Signs
Comprehensibility
Relevance
Trust
Credibility
Equilibrium selection

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Streb, Jorge M.
Torrens, Gustavo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
(wo)
Washington, DC
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Streb, Jorge M.
  • Torrens, Gustavo
  • Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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