Arbeitspapier

Worker absenteeism in search equilibrium

The paper presents a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers' and firms' behavior. The normative anlysis identifies externalities associated with firm-provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2947

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Fehlzeit
Friktionelle Arbeitslosigkeit
Sozialversicherung
Lohnfortzahlung
Zeitallokation
Personalzusatzkosten
Leistungsmotivation
Arbeitsangebot

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Engström, Per
Holmlund, Bertil
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Engström, Per
  • Holmlund, Bertil
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2007

Other Objects (12)