Arbeitspapier

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: Experimental evidence

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. We explore such considerations by extending the threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute to an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. We experimentally study the effects of the intermediary on contributions and successful public good funding. Results show that delegation increases overall contributions and public good success, but only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct funding received from donors to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary is detrimental, resulting in lower contributions, a higher probability of miscoordination, and lower payoffs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1412

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Public Goods
Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
Thema
Delegation
threshold public goods
laboratory experiment
fundraising

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Corazzini, Luca
Cotton, Christopher
Reggiani, Tommaso
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Corazzini, Luca
  • Cotton, Christopher
  • Reggiani, Tommaso
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2019

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