Arbeitspapier

Physician reimbursement, time-consistency and the quality of care

We use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians’ incentives to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation. If the price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner cannot implement the first-best policy. Moreover, the second-best policy is time inconsistent. Excess entry and firstbest efficient total quality provision is observed in the game without commitment. Allowing physicians to compete in prices does not solve the commitment problem since the competitive solution coincides with the time consistent outcome. In the median voter equilibrium the time consistency problem is more severe.

Alternative title
Ärztevergütung, Zeitkonsistenz und die Qualität medizinischer Leistungen
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 02-16

Classification
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Economics of Regulation
General Regional Economics (includes Regional Data)
Subject
Economics of health care markets
time consistency
price regulation
quality competition
spatial competition

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Nuscheler, Robert
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Nuscheler, Robert
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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