Arbeitspapier
Physician reimbursement, time-consistency and the quality of care
We use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians’ incentives to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation. If the price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner cannot implement the first-best policy. Moreover, the second-best policy is time inconsistent. Excess entry and firstbest efficient total quality provision is observed in the game without commitment. Allowing physicians to compete in prices does not solve the commitment problem since the competitive solution coincides with the time consistent outcome. In the median voter equilibrium the time consistency problem is more severe.
- Alternative title
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Ärztevergütung, Zeitkonsistenz und die Qualität medizinischer Leistungen
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 02-16
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Economics of Regulation
General Regional Economics (includes Regional Data)
- Subject
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Economics of health care markets
time consistency
price regulation
quality competition
spatial competition
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Nuscheler, Robert
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2002
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nuscheler, Robert
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2002