Arbeitspapier
Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition
High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions' output employ excess labor, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1791
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
National Budget; Budget Systems
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
- Thema
-
Öffentlicher Dienst
Kündigungsschutz
Personalbedarf
Öffentlicher Haushalt
Verwaltungskosten
Zeitkonsistenz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kessing, Sebastian G.
Konrad, Kai A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kessing, Sebastian G.
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2006
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