Epictetusian Rationality

Arbeitspapier

According to Epictetus, mental freedom and happiness can be achieved by distinguishing between, on the one hand, things that are upon our con- trol (our acts, opinions and desires), and, on the other hand, things that are not upon our control (our body, property, offi ces and reputation), and by wishing for nothing that is outside our control. This article proposes two accounts of Epictetus's precept: the I account of Epictetus's precept requires indifference between outcomes differing only on circumstances, whereas the IB account requires indifference between outcomes involving the best replies to circumstances. We study the implications of these precepts on the preference relation and on the existence of Epictetusian rationality. The I account implies that the preference relation satisfies in- dependence of circumstances, whereas the IB account implies robustness to dominated alternatives. Unlike the IB account, the I account rules out (counter)adaptive preferences. Finally, when examining game-theoretical implications of Epictetusian rationality, we show that the two accounts of Epictetus's precept exclude the existence of prisoner's dilemmas.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 1201

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; History of Economic Thought: Preclassical (Ancient, Medieval, Mercantilist, Physiocratic) ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Household Behavior: General
• Subject: rationality ; Epictetus ; preferences ; indifference ; independence ; adaptive preferences

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ponthiere, Gregory
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Global Labor Organization (GLO)
• (where): Essen
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/266375
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET