Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers

Arbeitspapier

This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older workers have only a few years left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the nearly retired unemployed workers rationally expect never to suffer from the punishment. This is why imposing a tax on the future job is particularly efficient in the context of older workers because the agency can now reward the job search by present employment subsidies. Moreover, we propose adopting a global approach to unemployment insurance by determining an optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4071

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Thema: Unemployment insurance ; retirement ; recursive contracts ; moral hazard ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Ältere Arbeitskräfte ; Altersgrenze ; Vertragstheorie ; Moral Hazard ; Alterssicherung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hairault, Jean-Olivier ; Langot, François ; Ménard, Sébastien ; Sopraseuth, Thepthida
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35612
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009033040
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 03.04.2023, 00:44 MESZ