Artikel
Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries
More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers' access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: IZA World of Labor ; ISSN: 2054-9571 ; Year: 2019 ; Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Informal Economy; Underground Economy
Informal Labor Markets
- Thema
-
self-employment
poverty
labor earnings
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ronconi, Lucas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.15185/izawol.457
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Ronconi, Lucas
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2019
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