- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource, 1 online resource.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Strict robustness to incomplete information ; volume:74 ; number:3 ; day:21 ; month:6 ; year:2023 ; pages:357-376 ; date:7.2023
The Japanese economic review ; 74, Heft 3 (21.6.2023), 357-376, 7.2023
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s42973-023-00136-3
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023110110005383418143
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:51 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Morris, Stephen
- Oyama, Daisuke
- Takahashi, Satoru
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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