Arbeitspapier

Regulating access to international large-value payment systems

This paper studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems when banking supervision is national task. We focus on the choice between net settlement or imposing real time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the communication between the supervisors is endogenized. It is shown that the national supervisors' preferences regarding the settlement method are not perfectly aligned. As a result, systemic risk is excessive under public regulation. Still, leaving access regulation to the private banks can only be optimal if they have superior information about the risk of their foreign counterparty in the settlement system.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 22

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holthausen, Cornelia
Rønde, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holthausen, Cornelia
  • Rønde, Thomas
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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