Arbeitspapier

Regulating access to international large-value payment systems

This paper studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems when banking supervision is national task. We focus on the choice between net settlement or imposing real time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the communication between the supervisors is endogenized. It is shown that the national supervisors' preferences regarding the settlement method are not perfectly aligned. As a result, systemic risk is excessive under public regulation. Still, leaving access regulation to the private banks can only be optimal if they have superior information about the risk of their foreign counterparty in the settlement system.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 22

Classification
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Holthausen, Cornelia
Rønde, Thomas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Holthausen, Cornelia
  • Rønde, Thomas
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Time of origin

  • 2000

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