Arbeitspapier

The Tragedy of Clientelism: Opting Children Out

Governments in new democracies launch social policies with the purported goal of alleviating the effects of poverty among the most vulnerable households, usually low income families with children. However, this goal is can be thwarted by the clientelistic distribution of social policies' benefits because politicians seek to maximize political support and children do not vote. Based on the main Argentine household survey and on personal interviews with 120 brokers, this paper shows that brokers collect information on family size and age composition and allocate temporary public works programs that are in excess demand discriminating against families with children not old enough to vote.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10973

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Thema
clientelism
household
discrimination
social policy
Latin America
Argentina

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ronconi, Lucas
Zarazaga, Rodrigo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ronconi, Lucas
  • Zarazaga, Rodrigo
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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