Arbeitspapier
The Tragedy of Corruption
We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of individual interest prevails and leads to the elimination of honest officials over time. Reducing the size of the groups while increasing the probability of collective sanction diminishes the officials' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the Tragedy of corruption that leads both firms and officials to earn less than in the absence of corruption.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10175
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Public Goods
- Thema
-
corruption
social dilemma
collective risk
sanction
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Chen, Yefeng
Jiang, Shuguang
Villeval, Marie Claire
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chen, Yefeng
- Jiang, Shuguang
- Villeval, Marie Claire
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2016