Arbeitspapier

The Tragedy of Corruption

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of individual interest prevails and leads to the elimination of honest officials over time. Reducing the size of the groups while increasing the probability of collective sanction diminishes the officials' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the Tragedy of corruption that leads both firms and officials to earn less than in the absence of corruption.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10175

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Public Goods
Thema
corruption
social dilemma
collective risk
sanction
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chen, Yefeng
Jiang, Shuguang
Villeval, Marie Claire
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chen, Yefeng
  • Jiang, Shuguang
  • Villeval, Marie Claire
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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