The Tragedy of Clientelism: Opting Children Out

Arbeitspapier

Governments in new democracies launch social policies with the purported goal of alleviating the effects of poverty among the most vulnerable households, usually low income families with children. However, this goal is can be thwarted by the clientelistic distribution of social policies' benefits because politicians seek to maximize political support and children do not vote. Based on the main Argentine household survey and on personal interviews with 120 brokers, this paper shows that brokers collect information on family size and age composition and allocate temporary public works programs that are in excess demand discriminating against families with children not old enough to vote.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10973

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General ; National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
• Subject: clientelism ; household ; discrimination ; social policy ; Latin America ; Argentina

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ronconi, Lucas ; Zarazaga, Rodrigo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170957
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET