Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes?

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs recently introduced in several European countries to induce firms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers. We find that a reform introducing an open-ended contract without layout costs for separations occurring at short tenure would have opposite effects.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10352

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
• Subject: temporary jobs ; employment protection legislation ; taxation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cahuc, Pierre ; Charlot, Olivier ; Malherbet, Franck ; Benghalem, Helène ; Limon, Emeline
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149211
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET