Artikel

Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule

Shortages in organs for transplantation have resulted in a renewed interest in designing incentive policies to promote organ supply. The donor-priority rule, which grants priority for transplantation based on deceased organ donor registration status, has proven to be effective in both theory and practice. This study investigates the implications of the donor-priority rule for optimal deceased organ allocation policy design under a general formulation of blood-type barriers. We find that for any blood typing and organ matching technology, reserving type X organs for only type X patients maximizes the aggregate donation rate under regular distributions, which also ensures equity in organ sharing. Moreover, this is the unique optimal allocation policy if and only if the directed compatibility graph that corresponds to a given organ matching technology is acyclic.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 17 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 331-369 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Design
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Thema
Market design
organ donation
priority rule
blood-type compatibility
equity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kim, Jaehong
Mengling Li
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE3969
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Kim, Jaehong
  • Mengling Li
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2022

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