Artikel

Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule

Shortages in organs for transplantation have resulted in a renewed interest in designing incentive policies to promote organ supply. The donor-priority rule, which grants priority for transplantation based on deceased organ donor registration status, has proven to be effective in both theory and practice. This study investigates the implications of the donor-priority rule for optimal deceased organ allocation policy design under a general formulation of blood-type barriers. We find that for any blood typing and organ matching technology, reserving type X organs for only type X patients maximizes the aggregate donation rate under regular distributions, which also ensures equity in organ sharing. Moreover, this is the unique optimal allocation policy if and only if the directed compatibility graph that corresponds to a given organ matching technology is acyclic.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 17 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 331-369 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Design
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Subject
Market design
organ donation
priority rule
blood-type compatibility
equity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kim, Jaehong
Mengling Li
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2022

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE3969
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Kim, Jaehong
  • Mengling Li
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2022

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