On the Frequency of Interior Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy

Arbeitspapier

In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good. For the case when all individuals have identical preferences in this paper a simple formula is derived that describes the proportion of all income distributions for which an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium will result in which every agent makes a strictly positive contribution to the public good. This formula is then applied to a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function showing that the likelihood of interior Cournot-Nash equilibria falls dramatically when the number of individuals is increased. The implications this result might have for the significance of Shibata-Warr neutrality are finally discussed.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 982

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: private provision of public goods ; Cournot-Nash equilibria ; Shibata-Warr neutrality

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Buchholz, Wolfgang ; Cornes, Richard ; Peters, Wolfgang
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76450
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET