Arbeitspapier

Supranational rules, national discretion: Increasing versus inflating regulatory bank capital?

We study how higher capital requirements introduced at the supranational level affect the regulatory capital of banks across countries. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that treated banks exploit discretion in the calculation of regulatory capital to inflate their capital ratios without a commensurate increase in their book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. Regulatory capital inflation is more pronounced in countries where credit supply is expected to tighten, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 296

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gropp, Reint
Mosk, Thomas
Ongena, Steven
Simac, Ines
Wix, Carlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3736781
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gropp, Reint
  • Mosk, Thomas
  • Ongena, Steven
  • Simac, Ines
  • Wix, Carlo
  • Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Time of origin

  • 2020

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