Arbeitspapier

Rules versus discretion in fiscal policy

This paper purports to apply the Kydland-Prescott framework of dynamic inconsistency to the case of fiscal policy, by considering the trade-off between output and debt stabilization. The Government budget constraint provides the link between debt dynamics and the level of activity, influenced by fiscal policy. Contrary to what happens in the monetary policy framework, however, a commitment is not always superior to discretion, even in the absence of uncertainty, but only when the public debt-GDP ratio is sufficiently large. The introduction of uncertainty, as usual, implies a reduction in the net benefit generated by the adoption of a fixed rule.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni di Dipartimento - EPMQ ; No. 199

Classification
Wirtschaft
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Fiscal Policy
National Deficit; Surplus
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt
Subject
rules
discretion
time inconsistency
fiscal policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bianchi, Carluccio
Menegatti, Mario
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ)
(where)
Pavia
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bianchi, Carluccio
  • Menegatti, Mario
  • Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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