Arbeitspapier

Supranational rules, national discretion: Increasing versus inflating regulatory bank capital?

We study how higher capital requirements introduced at the supranational level affect the regulatory capital of banks across countries. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that treated banks exploit discretion in the calculation of regulatory capital to inflate their capital ratios without a commensurate increase in their book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. Regulatory capital inflation is more pronounced in countries where credit supply is expected to tighten, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 296

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gropp, Reint
Mosk, Thomas
Ongena, Steven
Simac, Ines
Wix, Carlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3736781
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gropp, Reint
  • Mosk, Thomas
  • Ongena, Steven
  • Simac, Ines
  • Wix, Carlo
  • Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Entstanden

  • 2020

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