Arbeitspapier
Setting Incentives: Temporary Performance Premiums Versus Promotion Tournaments
Two alternative relative compensation schemes are compared with respect to total output that can be generated at a given sum of salaries. While the promotion regime guarantees that any salary increase is permanent, the premium system allows a reduction in the income of an agent to the base salary after one period. It is shown that the optimum promotion tournament system induces a higher total output than the optimum premium system. This result occurs because a promotion regime allows distortion in a contest in favor of winners of previous contests.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 432
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Tournament
relative compensation
internal labor markets
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Meier, Volker
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Meier, Volker
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001
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