Arbeitspapier

Strategic spending in voting competitions with social networks

This paper proposes a model of voting competitions (political campaigns and strategic lobbying) where voters are influenced by the opinion of their neighbors on a social network. In the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium, resources are targeted toward individuals with an influential position in the network. This finding contrasts with previous theories of strategic spending which predict that parties (or lobbies) should spend more on individuals who have a higher probability of being pivotal for the vote. The paper then tests the model using data on campaign contributions by interests groups in the US. House of Representatives. The estimations show that both network influence and pivotality are significant predictors of campaign contributions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2010-16

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
network games
strategic spending
Colonel Blotto games
counteractive lobbying
Bonacich centrality

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lever Guzmán, Carlos
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Banco de México
(wo)
Ciudad de México
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lever Guzmán, Carlos
  • Banco de México

Entstanden

  • 2010

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