Arbeitspapier
Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments
Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party representing the health insurance which finances medical service provision. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoffs of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical services. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: FAU Discussion Papers in Economics ; No. 18/2017
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Field Experiments
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- Thema
-
health economic experiment
framing
physician behavior
prospective payment schemes
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hafner, Lucas
Reif, Simon
Seebauer, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institute for Economics
- (wo)
-
Nürnberg
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hafner, Lucas
- Reif, Simon
- Seebauer, Michael
- Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institute for Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments
Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes – A Laboratory Experiment
Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes – A Laboratory Experiment
Physician altruism under the change from pure payment system to mixed payment schemes: experimental evidence
Payment Schemes, Returns and Works Councils
The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes
Choice over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort
Reciprocity and payment schemes: when equality is unfair
Binary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversion
Reciprocity and payment schemes : when equality is unfair
How to Improve Patient Care? – An Analysis of Capitation, Fee-for-Service, and Mixed Payment Schemes for Physicians
How to Improve Patient Care? – An Analysis of Capitation, Fee-for-Service, and Mixed Payment Schemes for Physicians
Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments
Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes – A Laboratory Experiment
Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes – A Laboratory Experiment
Physician altruism under the change from pure payment system to mixed payment schemes: experimental evidence
Payment Schemes, Returns and Works Councils
The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes
Choice over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort
Reciprocity and payment schemes: when equality is unfair
Binary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversion
Reciprocity and payment schemes : when equality is unfair
How to Improve Patient Care? – An Analysis of Capitation, Fee-for-Service, and Mixed Payment Schemes for Physicians
How to Improve Patient Care? – An Analysis of Capitation, Fee-for-Service, and Mixed Payment Schemes for Physicians
Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments
Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes – A Laboratory Experiment
Sorting into Physician Payment Schemes – A Laboratory Experiment
Physician altruism under the change from pure payment system to mixed payment schemes: experimental evidence
Payment Schemes, Returns and Works Councils
The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes
Choice over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort
Reciprocity and payment schemes: when equality is unfair
Binary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversion
Reciprocity and payment schemes : when equality is unfair
How to Improve Patient Care? – An Analysis of Capitation, Fee-for-Service, and Mixed Payment Schemes for Physicians