Arbeitspapier

International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy

International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 96.1997

Classification
Wirtschaft
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
Welfare Economics: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
Energy and the Macroeconomy
Subject
Coalitions
International Agreements
Environment
Political Economy
Games

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Carraro, Carlo
Siniscalco, Domenico
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
1997

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Carraro, Carlo
  • Siniscalco, Domenico
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 1997

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