Arbeitspapier

The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS) and is unique under plausible conditions. Contributions in the MAM experiment overall averaged 94.9%. The data support BEWDS rather than subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Quantifying subjects' responses to the questionnaire showed that the majority of subjects in the MAM found a heuristic or an algorithm named diagonalization and supported the notions of minimax regret and iterated best response, all of which mimic BEWDS outcomes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 874

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Public Goods
Other Economic Systems: Public Economics; Financial Economics
Thema
Public good experiment
Approval mechanism
Assumed equilibrium concepts
Öffentliche Güter
Allokation
Pareto-Optimum
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Masuda, Takehito
Okano, Yoshitaka
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Masuda, Takehito
  • Okano, Yoshitaka
  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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