Arbeitspapier

Smooth multibidding mechanisms

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is 'smoother' in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3394

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
mechanism design
NIMBY
Projektbewertung
Standortwahl
Auktionstheorie
Mechanism Design
Shapley-Wert
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pérez-Castrillo, David
Quérou, Nicolas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Pérez-Castrillo, David
  • Quérou, Nicolas
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2011

Ähnliche Objekte (12)