Smooth multibidding mechanisms

Arbeitspapier

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is 'smoother' in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3394

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: mechanism design ; NIMBY ; Projektbewertung ; Standortwahl ; Auktionstheorie ; Mechanism Design ; Shapley-Wert ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Quérou, Nicolas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46454