Arbeitspapier

On the performance of rule-based contribution schemes under endowment heterogeneity

We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from minimum contribution rules under random allocation. Under effort-based allocations, substantial efficiency gains relative to a VCM occur, though being largely driven by significant reductions of contributions in VCM. By apparently influencing the perception of fair burden sharing, the endowment allocation procedure crucially impacts voluntary contributions under VCM, while the rule-based mechanisms generate stable efficiency levels, even though endowment heterogeneity substantially limits the ability of rule-based mechanisms to achieve the potential efficiency gains.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 14-055

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Thema
public good
institutions
minimum contribution rules
cooperation
endowment heterogeneity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kesternich, Martin
Lange, Andreas
Sturm, Bodo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2014

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-370330
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kesternich, Martin
  • Lange, Andreas
  • Sturm, Bodo
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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