Anti-Sharing.

Arbeitspapier

The paper proposes a mechanism that may implement first-best effort in simultaneous teams. Within the framework of this mechanism, each team members is obliged to make a fixed, non-contingent payment, and chooses his individual effort. After the output is produced, each team member receives a gross payment that equals the actual team output. We demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium exists in which each team member chooses first-best effort. We call this mechanism ?Anti-Sharing? since it solves the sharing problem that causes the inefficiency in teams. The Anti-Sharing mechanism requires one player to specialize on the role of an ?Anti-Sharer?. With an external Anti-Sharer who works on a non-profit base, the mechanism can implement first-best effort. If, however, the Anti-Sharer comes from within the team and desires a positive payoff, then the mechanism may implement not more than second-best effort. The latter version of the model could be interpreted as a new theory of firms and partnerships in the sense of the theory of Alchian and Demsetz (1972).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 2003-02

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Business Economics
• Subject: Efficient Effort in Teams ; Second-Best Solution ; Partnerships

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kirstein, Roland ; Cooter, Robert
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
• (where): Saarbrücken
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23131
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET