Arbeitspapier

Conservatism and liquidity traps

In an economy with an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, the anticipation of future ZLB episodes creates a trade-off for discretionary central banks between inflation and output stabilization. As a consequence, inflation systematically falls below target even when the policy rate is above zero. Appointing Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central banker mitigates this deflationary bias away from the ZLB and enhances welfare by improving allocations both at and away from the ZLB.

ISBN
978-92-899-1629-5
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1816

Classification
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Subject
Deflationary Bias
Inflation Conservatism
Inflation Targeting
Liquidity Traps
zero lower bound

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schmidt, Sebastian
Nakata, Taisuke
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schmidt, Sebastian
  • Nakata, Taisuke
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Time of origin

  • 2015

Other Objects (12)