Arbeitspapier
Conservatism and liquidity traps
In an economy with an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, the anticipation of future ZLB episodes creates a trade-off for discretionary central banks between inflation and output stabilization. As a consequence, inflation systematically falls below target even when the policy rate is above zero. Appointing Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central banker mitigates this deflationary bias away from the ZLB and enhances welfare by improving allocations both at and away from the ZLB.
- ISBN
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978-92-899-1629-5
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1816
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- Subject
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Deflationary Bias
Inflation Conservatism
Inflation Targeting
Liquidity Traps
zero lower bound
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schmidt, Sebastian
Nakata, Taisuke
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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European Central Bank (ECB)
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
-
2015
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schmidt, Sebastian
- Nakata, Taisuke
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Time of origin
- 2015