Arbeitspapier
Conservatism and liquidity traps
In an economy with an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, the anticipation of future ZLB episodes creates a trade-off for discretionary central banks between inflation and output stabilization. As a consequence, inflation systematically falls below target even when the policy rate is above zero. Appointing Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central banker mitigates this deflationary bias away from the ZLB and enhances welfare by improving allocations both at and away from the ZLB.
- ISBN
-
978-92-899-1629-5
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1816
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- Thema
-
Deflationary Bias
Inflation Conservatism
Inflation Targeting
Liquidity Traps
zero lower bound
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schmidt, Sebastian
Nakata, Taisuke
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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European Central Bank (ECB)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schmidt, Sebastian
- Nakata, Taisuke
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Entstanden
- 2015