Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signaling and Absorbing Games

Arbeitspapier

An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage. We prove that every n-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium. In other words, for every epsilon>0 there exits a probability distribution p (epsilon subscript) over the space of pure strategy profiles such that if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p (epsilon subscript) and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than epsilon in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1272

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Solan, Eilon ; Vohra, Rakesh V.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 1999

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221628
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET