Artikel

Local agency costs of political centralization

We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources from public services but contributed part to benefit the ruler. The autocratic ruler would value better public services only when residents reduce taxable investments which become unprofitable without good public services. For local government to benefit local residents, they must have some decentralized power to punish an official who serves them badly even while serving the ruler well

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 425-448 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Public Goods
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Thema
Local public goods
moral hazard
decentralized democracy
centralized autocracy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Myerson, Roger B.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE3763
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Myerson, Roger B.
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2021

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