Artikel
Corporate Investment, Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs in the UK
This paper investigates whether investment spending of firms is sensitive to the availability of internal funds. Imperfect capital markets create a hierarchy for the different sources of funds such that investment and financial decisions are not independent. The relation between corporate investment and free cash flow is investigated using the Bond and Meghir (1994a) Euler-equation model for a panel of 240 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange over a 6-year period. This method allows for a direct test of the first-order condition of an intertemporal maximisation problem. It does not require the use of Tobin's q, which is subject to mis-measurement problems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung ; ISSN: 1861-1559 ; Volume: 70 ; Year: 2001 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 248-260 ; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Investition
Investitionsentscheidung
Eigentümerstruktur
Corporate Governance
Asymmetrische Information
Großbritannien
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goergen, Marc
Renneboog, Luc
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Duncker & Humblot
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2001
- DOI
-
doi:10.3790/vjh.70.2.248
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Goergen, Marc
- Renneboog, Luc
- Duncker & Humblot
Entstanden
- 2001
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